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Critical psychology in a context of ongoing acts of colonisation 
Damien W. Riggs 
Flinders University 
Abstract 
Although encompassing a broad range of topic areas, approaches to analysis, and theoretical frameworks, it is 
arguably the case that critical psychology in Australia is best represented by research undertaken on the topic of 
racism. The primary reason why critical research on racism has been so prevalent in Australia, is because of the 
ongoing history of colonisation in the country. Critical psychological approaches thus allow for a political (and 
discursive) examination of the psychology of racism. This paper first outlines the context of Australia as a 
colonial nation, before going on to analyse a press release made by one Australian politician in 2011. The 
analysis, focused primarily on specific rhetorical devices, examines how Indigenous sovereignty - centred in the 
paper as an empirical fact against which all knowledge or truth claims must be assessed - is denied, and 
moreover how the press release signifies an investment in this denial. The paper concludes by suggesting that 
critical psychology in Australia has an important ongoing role both in deconstructing existing truth claims about 
race, as well as reconstructing new possibilities for thinking about and relating to the fact of Indigenous 
sovereignty and colonisation. 
Keywords: Australia, critical psychology, racism, colonisation, Indigenous sovereignty, politics 
As the time drew nearer for writing this piece, a rather interesting (though highly problematic) 
press release was issued by Mr Ted Baillieu, the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs in the 
Australian State of Victoria. The press release was problematic for the logic that it employed 
in regards to the recognition of Indigenous people accorded by Mr Baillieu and the Liberal 
party of which he is a Minister. It was, nonetheless, interesting as a prime example of the 
rhetoric of inclusivity employed by many Australian politicians in regards to Indigenous 
people. As such, and by way of introducing one, arguably central, aspect of critical 
psychology in Australia to an international readership, this paper analyses in close detail the 
contents of this press release. 
Before going on to analyse the press release, however, it is important to signal why its 
contents allow for reflection upon the state of critical psychology in Australia. The reasons for 
this are twofold. First, the fact of Australia’s ongoing colonial history - one in which 
racialised hierarchies and practices of domination produce racial difference as a key site of 
contestation – is something that requires continued attention from critical researchers. In 
writing this paper, then, and bearing in mind the remit of this special issue to describe the 
features of critical psychology in one given region – in this case Australia – my argument is 
that whilst critical psychology in Australia is constituted by a broad and diverse range of 
research interests and areas of focus, it is racism, and its particularly insidious neo-colonial 
forms, that must be given sustained attention. Focusing on Mr Baillieu’s press release thus 
provides an opportunity to demonstrate one of the ways in which critical psychology in 
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Australia can make a contribution to challenging racialised and colonising networks of 
discursive power. 
 
The second and related reason why focusing on the press release from Mr Baillieu provides a 
useful way of considering the role of critical psychology in Australia is due to the fact that 
critical psychological research in Australia to date has resulted in the production of a 
sustained body of critical psychological research on racism, largely spearheaded by Professor 
Martha Augoustinos at the University of Adelaide (e.g., Augoustinos & Every, 2007; 
Augoustinos, LeCouteur & Soyland, 2002; Augoustinos, Tuffin & Rapley, 1999; Hanson-
Easey & Augoustinos, 2010; LeCouteur & Augoustinos, 2001; LeCouteur, Rapley & 
Augoustinos, 2001; O’Doherty & Augoustinos, 2008), though over the past decade such 
research has been increasingly added to by academics from across Australia. Discursive 
research on racism in Australia continues to make a vital contribution to identifying and 
naming the rhetorical tools through which politicians specifically, as well as the general 
public more broadly, make claims about groups such as Indigenous people and refugees, 
claims that legitimate the marginalisation of these groups.  
 
In order to provide further context for the analysis that is presented here, it is important to 
first examine in some detail the history of Australia as a colonial nation, in order to highlight 
the broader social factors at play in relation to the press release. Whilst the analysis of the 
press release that I provide below is focused to a large degree on the micro level of discourse, 
introducing the colonial context first, and referring back to it throughout the analysis of the 
press release, also demonstrates the need for macro level analyses of the discursive operations 
of racialised power in colonial nations such as Australia. 
 
Colonisation in Australia 
 
As many readers of this article might already be aware, the colonisation of Australia involved 
the dispossession and genocide of the more than 200 First Nations whose sovereignty over the 
continent has existed for over 40, 000 years. In contrast to colonial nations such as the United 
States and New Zealand – where some form of treaty was negotiated with Indigenous people 
(even if in many instances this was not adhered to) – Australia was ‘taken possession’ in the 
name of King George III, despite an awareness on the part of both Captain Cook and the 
British monarchy that Australia was already inhabited. The fact of Indigenous sovereignty 
was circumvented by declaring the continent as ‘Terra Nullius’ – as ‘land of no one’. This 
legal assumption presumed not that the land was literally empty, but that it was legally empty 
of property owning subjects who could hold a rightful or recognised claim to sovereignty. 
Such an assumption, which required the brutal enforcement of the presumed to be sovereign 
rights of the British monarchy, has thus informed relationships between Indigenous and non-
indigenous (specifically white) people since first contact. 
 
Yet the denial of Indigenous sovereignties by white colonisers does not mean that such 
sovereignties do not continue to exist, nor that Indigenous people have not consistently 
resisted the theft of their lands (Moreton-Robinson, 2003). Whilst white people may have 
gained control of much of the land that constitutes Australia through the (illegal) claiming of 
the land as a possession of the Australian nation State (proclaimed as such in 1901), the 
existence of Indigenous sovereignty has not been extinguished. As Moreton-Robinson notes, 
Indigenous people carry their sovereign rights to land with them through their ontological 
relationship to country. Displacement from their country, dispossession of their land, and the 
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denial of the right to speak their language or practice their culture does not mean that 
sovereignty over land and knowledge of culture does not continue.  
 
Recognition of ongoing sovereignty – within Australian law – was demonstrated in the 
landmark Mabo2 land rights case in 1992, where the High Court of Australia recognised the 
inherent rights of Indigenous people to hold title to land as First Nations people. Yet this has 
not been without consequence. Following the Mabo2 outcome the then Labor government 
passed the Native Title Act (1993), which outlined the mechanisms through which land could 
be claimed by Indigenous nations. Subsequently, however, when the coalition government 
(constituted primarily by the Liberal party) came into power in 1996, it introduced the Native 
Title Amendment Act, 1998, which significantly tightened the requirements for the claiming 
of land rights. This amendment to the Act was passed in many ways as a response to the 
findings of the Wik land rights claim, which recognised that Native Title is not inherently 
extinguished by the granting of a pastoral lease. Findings such as these were seen as 
constituting a threat to the sovereignty of the Australian nation, hence the passing of the 
Native Title Amendment Act to protect the interests of mining companies and pastoralists. 
 
Since the passing of the Act some land claims have been successful (such as the Miriuwung 
Gajjerong case), many have not been recognised by the High Court (such as those by the 
Yarmirr, Fejo and Yorta Yorta people). In the case of the Yorta Yorta, the testimony of white 
pastoralists and anthropologists were used to ‘prove’ that the Yorta Yorta people had not had 
‘continuous contact with their lands’ and, in Justice Olney’s words, that the ‘tide of history’ 
had ‘washed away’ native title (Moreton-Robinson, 2004). This represents one particular 
example of the legal fiction of Terra Nullius being used to perpetuate the claiming of 
sovereignty by the Australian nation, where native title is defined according to the rules of the 
nation, and where the testimony of white people is taken as ‘reliable evidence’. 
 
To reiterate, however, such legal determinations fail to recognise that Indigenous peoples 
never ceded sovereignty to their land, and that Australia is thus a nation located upon land 
that is illegally possessed. Further to this, Moreton-Robinson notes that cases such as that of 
the Yorta Yorta not only centre non-indigenous laws and interpretations of proof and 
evidence, but they also fail to treat Indigenous people as subjects of colonial law itself. As 
Moreton-Robinson cogently argues, the judges of the High Court failed to apply common law 
precedent in making their determination about the Yorta Yorta claim. As she notes:  
 
In the Mabo 2 decision the Justices held that when the Crown asserted 
sovereignty, the indigenous people of Australia became subjects of the Crown 
and as such entitled to the protection of the imported Common law which 
extended to protection of existing property rights. 
 
That the judges in the Yorta Yorta case did not apply this common law finding represents a 
failure that can only have resulted from their inability to conceive of Indigenous peoples as 
subjects of Australian law (which they have been since being ‘granted’ citizenship in 1967). 
 
As this brief history of colonisation in Australia would suggest, then, contestations over who 
has the right to define ownership continue, yet such contestations fundamentally fail to 
recognise the ongoing fact of Indigenous sovereignty, and the location of all Australians upon 
land that is stolen. Moreover, I would hope that this brief discussion of Australia’s ongoing 
colonial history highlights the ways in which critical psychology’s ongoing (and for the most 
part justified) scepticism of fact claims is incommensurate with an understanding of 
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sovereignty issues in Australia. Whilst we might, as critical researchers, wish to be sceptical 
of claims made by politicians when they speak of ‘the nation’, such scepticism, I would 
argue, is not applicable when we consider Indigenous sovereignty. In other words, and as 
Fiona Nicoll (2000, p. 370) states, “Indigenous sovereignty exists because I cannot know of 
what it consists; my epistemological artillery cannot penetrate it”. Treating Indigenous 
sovereignty as a fact is thus not contrary to the critical psychological focus upon the 
construction of ‘truth claims’. Rather, it highlights the cultural specificity of such a focus.  
 
Racism and Recognition in the Press Release 
 
To return to critical psychological research on racism in Australia, then; in addition to 
identifying the complex ways in which marginalisation is often couched in terms of 
inclusivity, Australian critical psychological research has also emphasised the subjective 
investments that non-indigenous (and specifically white) Australians have in depicting 
Indigenous people in very specific, stereotyped, ways (e.g., Due & Riggs, 2011; Riggs & 
Augoustinos, 2004; 2005). Given the above outlined history of colonisation in Australia, this 
research has emphasised such subjective investments not as intrapsychic processes per se, but 
rather as collective discursive resources that produce a particular form of tightly regulated 
intelligibility for white Australians, one in which the denial of colonisation and Indigenous 
sovereignty operates as an overriding principle. Such investments function to render invisible 
the operations of racial privilege, precisely by making invisible the denials that underpin them 
(what, following Freud, we might term the repression of racism. See Riggs, 2003; 2007). 
 
An investment in denying Indigenous sovereignty is evident in the press release made by Mr 
Baillieu. The very topic of the press release itself signifies an unwarranted investment in 
denialism: the press release was concerned with stating both that making an acknowledgment 
of traditional owners is not a mandatory part of public functions, but that the Victorian 
government is committed to policies that recognise and support Indigenous people. For 
international readers, it has increasingly become commonplace for public events (such as 
conferences, gallery exhibition openings, and public speeches) to include either a welcome to 
country made by an elder of the Indigenous nation upon whose lands the event is held, or in 
absence of this for the opening speaker to begin their address by acknowledging the 
sovereignty of the Indigenous nation upon whose land the event is held. 
 
Opening with the disclaimer “The Victorian Coalition Government recognises the first 
peoples of this nation through a variety of mechanisms including, where appropriate, 
acknowledging traditional owners past and present”, the press release then moves swiftly on 
to state that “Acknowledgement of Country is not mandated, never has been, and nor should it 
be. The Coalition Government believes that such acknowledgements may be diminished if 
they become tokenistic” and later closes with the comment “and the Premier and other 
representatives of the Victorian Coalition Government will continue to acknowledge the first 
peoples of this nation - not because it is mandated, but because we choose to do so out of 
respect. We all have a deep and enduring respect for Aboriginal peoples”.  
 
In the refutation that follows the opening disclaimer, Mr Baillieu constructs as taken for 
granted the claim that an acknowledgment of country should not be mandated. This is 
achieved through the rhetorical device of maximization in the form of a three-part list, where 
Mr Baillieu states that an acknowledgement is “not mandated, never has been, and nor should 
it be”.  Yet despite the consensus warrant that is implicit in this claim, it is far from the case 
that this is a universally agreed upon issue. For some people and institutions (i.e., those who 
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recognize Indigenous sovereignty as a fact and thus treat an acknowledgement of country as a 
protocol that must be observed), an acknowledgement is indeed mandated as but one way of 
recognising the ongoing sovereignty of Indigenous nations. To state that it never has been 
mandatory, then, is incorrect.  
 
The moral claim made in the third part of the maximising list – ‘nor should it be’ – is 
bolstered by the sentence that follows it, in which the mandating of an acknowledgement is 
constructed as ‘tokenistic’. Here Mr Baillieu deploys a rhetorically self-sufficient argument to 
deny the need to mandate acknowledgements of country. This is only possible, I would 
suggest, precisely because Mr Baillieu fails to recognise that in treating acknowledgments as 
a matter of choice for any given speaker, this in effect constructs acknowledgements as 
always already tokenistic. Tokenism, by definition, references something done in a 
perfunctory or merely symbolic manner. Of course when an acknowledgement of country is 
done simply on the whim of the speaker, and when it is not connected to the aim of 
continually challenging and rendering visible ongoing acts of colonisation (by explicitly 
recognising the fact of Indigenous sovereignty), then such an acknowledgement is indeed 
tokenistic. By contrast, an acknowledgment given because it is protocol to do so (because the 
sovereignty of Indigenous nations must always be recognised) is far from tokenistic – it is a 
very real act of challenge to denialist narratives of colonisation. 
 
Looking at the closing sentences from the press release, we see further how Mr Baillieu 
constructs as common sense his denial of the need to mandate acknowledgements of country, 
in his statement that Liberal politicians will make an acknowledgment “not because it is 
mandated, but because we choose to do so out of respect”. Here making an acknowledgement 
is constructed as a personal choice, not a political act, and certainly not an act demanded by 
the context of standing on ground illegally possessed that must be recognised as the sovereign 
property of a First Nation. Mr Baillieu’s use of the word ‘choose’ highlights the considerable 
privilege accorded to non-indigenous (and specifically white) people to decide where and 
when they will recognise the other (Hage, 1998; Nicoll, 2004). Of course this notion of choice 
is undermined by Mr Baillieu’s subsequent use of the word ‘respect’: if a choice is made on 
the basis of respect, then surely there is always the possibility that due to a lack of respect any 
individual may refuse to ‘choose’ to acknowledge country. Where the onus for respect lies is 
unclear in Mr Baillieu’s press release, however it is quite common for the suggestion to be 
that respect must be earned. This would suggest, then, that whether or not any individual 
‘chooses’ to make an acknowledgement out of respect is contingent upon whether they 
perceive the Indigenous other as deserving respect. Again, this type of logic does not make 
for truly inclusive practices that are grounded in the fact of Indigenous sovereignty and 
ongoing colonisation, but rather hinges inclusivity upon the actions of the other. 
 
Mr Baillieu’s closing sentence is also notable for its reference to Indigenous peoples. Again, 
this statement fails to adequately centre the issue as one related to sovereignty and land 
ownership, and instead reduces acknowledgements to respect for peoples (rather than 
nations). Whilst it could be argued that, to at least some degree, the term ‘peoples’ recognized 
a grouping or collective, it falls short of recognizing the sovereignty of those peoples and the 
status of their group as a sovereign nation. Of course, to mandate that representatives of the 
Australian nation (i.e., politicians) must acknowledge the owners of the nation upon which 
they stand may well be seen as a difficult position to adopt (and certainly some on the 
political right would refer to this as ‘divisive’). This point aside, such an acknowledgement 
would nonetheless render it perfectly clear that whilst Australia might exist as an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 1983), it is located upon land whose sovereignty still resides with the 
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more than 200 First Nations situated across the land colonised as ‘Australia’ (even if legal 
recognition of this sovereignty is still yet to occur for most nations).  
 
This problematic emphasis upon peoples rather than nations is epitomised in the sample 
acknowledgement that Mr Baillieu provides in his press release (taken from a previous speech 
by the Victorian Premier): “I would like to start today by acknowledging the traditional 
owners of the land past and present. In so doing I want to make it clear that our Government 
acknowledges the special place indigenous [sic] Victorians occupy as the original inhabitants 
and custodians of this state”. Mr Baillieu goes on in his press release to state that this type of 
acknowledgment is a “real and genuine acknowledgement that means something to both the 
speaker and the audience, rather than a mandated set of words”. This emphasis upon ‘real and 
genuine’ constructs these terms as taken for granted, without considering for whom they 
might be experienced as such. Whilst Mr Baillieu employs a consensus warrant to claim that 
the words “mean something to both the speaker and the audience”, we in fact have no way of 
knowing what they mean for the audience. Rather, this is a rhetorically self-sufficient 
argument that makes the claim that the speaker of the sample acknowledgement is ‘real’ and 
‘genuine’.  
 
If we are, here for a specific purpose, to take this claim by Mr Baillieu at face value (which 
normally we would refrain from doing when it comes to politicians), then it is worth 
considering what is being referenced as ‘real and genuine’. In the sample acknowledgement 
itself, reference is made to “the special place indigenous Victorians [sic] occupy as the 
original inhabitants and custodians of this state”. What is ‘real’ and ‘genuine’ about this 
acknowledgement, I would suggest, is the fact that it clearly evidences the investment of 
white Australians in curtailing Indigenous sovereignty. This most clearly occurs through the 
delimiting of Indigenous people in Victoria to a ‘special place’, rather than recognising that 
all of the land referred to as ‘Victoria’ is the place of Indigenous nations. Further, the term 
‘Indigenous Victorians’ engages in an act of epistemic violence, wherein what is referenced 
as a collective is in fact a product of a colonial mode of naming: Victoria the state is located 
upon the lands of 19 Indigenous nations. The term ‘Indigenous Victorians’, then, reduces this 
complexity to a collective term that is subsumed by the higher-level term ‘Victorian’. This 
reduction of Indigenous people in Victoria to the term ‘Indigenous Victorians’ also fails to 
distinguish between Indigenous people living in Victoria upon their traditional lands (which 
would likely be the minority of people) and Indigenous people living in Victoria upon the 
lands of other Indigenous nations (which is the case for the majority of Indigenous people in 
Australia, either because of dispossession from their own lands and/or because of the 
demands of the economy and the need to move to areas where employment and services are 
available).  
 
Finally, the sample acknowledgement is problematic for its reference to ‘Indigenous 
Victorians’ as the “original inhabitants and custodians of this state”. This is problematic first 
because it continues the frame of reference as the ‘state’, when this is a nonsense in reference 
to nations who lived on the land now colonized as Victoria for 40, 000 years before it was 
classified a ‘state’. Moreover, it is problematic for its implicit ‘now and then’ construction of 
‘custodianship’, where it is ‘in the past’ that Indigenous people’s ‘custodianship’ is located 
(i.e., ‘original’).  And of course the very term ‘custodianship’ is problematic for its reduction 
of the complex ontological relationship that Indigenous people have to land to a notion of 
‘custodianship’. 
 
In sum, what I have suggested in the analysis provided here is that Mr Baillieu displays what 
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Moreton-Robinson (2004) refers to as a ‘possessive investment’ in both Indigenous people 
and the land upon which Victoria is located. He makes claims about Indigenous people that 
may be read as an attempt at delimiting Indigenous peoples’ authority and denying their 
sovereignty, and in so centres an image of Victoria as part of the sovereign nation state of 
Australia. Importantly, the claims I have made here about Mr Baillieu’s press release is not 
intended to impute anything about his own beliefs or attitudes towards Indigenous people per 
se. Rather, it is intended to render visible the forms of intelligibility that non-indigenous (and 
specifically white) Australians engage in when making claims about the land upon which we 
live, and the violence this can perpetuate against Indigenous people. In the following 
concluding section I take this point and consider its implications for what critical psychology 
in Australia can contribute to our understanding of ongoing colonialisms and the potential for 
challenging them. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this brief paper I have sought to highlight what is unique about Australia in terms of its 
ongoing colonial history, and to explore one way in which critical psychology can contribute 
to the unpacking of this. As the above rhetorical analysis of Mr Baillieu’s press release would 
suggest, what often appears to lie at the heart of much of what is said in the public sphere 
about Indigenous people is a cultural drive towards denying colonization, but also denying the 
ongoing fact of Indigenous sovereignty (Due & Riggs, 2011). These two forms of denial are, 
of course, somewhat paradoxical, in that denying colonisation forces our attention to the 
history of the land, and this can only result in a demand to focus upon whose land it is. This 
type of paradox produces for white Australians what Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos 
(2004) refer to as an ‘ontological disturbance’, one in which any claim to belonging must be 
premised upon recognition of the history of where one is claiming to belong, yet for white 
Australians this requires recognition of both colonisation and the fact of Indigenous 
sovereignty, recognition of which accounts such as those provided by Mr Baillieu appear 
invested in denying. 
 
What critical psychology can offer, in response, is a non-individualising, non-internalising 
account of white subjectivities in Australia, one that allows both for the rhetorical devices that 
are deployed to manage the above mentioned ontological disturbance to be rendered visible, 
but importantly also for new ways of thinking about belonging to be developed (Riggs & 
Augoustinos, 2008). In this sense, and following Teo’s (1999) excellent points about the role 
of critical psychology in challenging racism in the very first issue of the Annual Review of 
Critical Psychology, what are required are approaches that both deconstruct existing binaries 
and stereotypes, but also reconstruct new possibilities. In the case of Australia, critical 
psychology thus has an important role to play in continuing to examine the operations of 
racialised power that operate to privilege certain groups at the expense of others, and to do so 
with the intent of considering the forms of intelligibility that might make possible a claim to 
belonging in Australia for non-indigenous people that truly engages with the fact of 
Indigenous sovereignty. 
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